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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOIE D. NELSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
ROD BETIT, in his capacity 
as Executive Director of 
the DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SERVICES, 
Defendant and Appellee, 
Case No. 960489-CA 
Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISPJCTIQN 
This is an appeal from a final order of the District Court 
of the Second Judicial District granting the motion for summary 
judgement of the defendant Department of Human Services (DHS) and 
denying plaintiff Joie D. Nelson's motion for summary judgment. 
Nelson appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. The Supreme Court 
subsequently transferred the case to the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1996). 
1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE? AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are relevant to the 
determination of this case: 
42 U.S.C.S. §§ 602(a) (17) (1985); 602(a) (24) (Supp. 1996) 
45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a) (1) (ii) (1992) . 
45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(F) (1992). 
Utah Department of Human Services, Office of Family Support 
Policy Manual, Volume II, §§ 122 and 438. See Addendum A. 
ISSUES PRESENTED/STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was the trial court correct in ruling that Nelson had 
not yet "received" Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on the date 
that she received her retroactive lump sum Social Security 
Disability Income Benefit (SSDIB) award, which resulted in her 
household being ineligible for Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) and Medicaid for several months? 
In reviewing an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the 
appellate court views the facts in the light most favorable to 
the losing party below. In determining whether those facts 
require, as a matter of law# the entry of judgment for the 
prevailing party below, the appellate court gives no deference to 
the trial court's conclusions of law, which are reviewed for 
correctness. Harlin v. Barker. 912 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1996); 
2 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah v. State. 779 P.2d 634, 636 
(Utah 1989). 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
In July 1992, Nelson and her son were recipients of AFDC and 
Medicaid benefits from the Utah Department of Human Services. On 
July 28, 1992, Nelson applied for Social Security Disability 
Insurance Benefits (SSDIB) and for Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) disability benefits. 
On October 17, 1992, the Social Security Administration 
(SSA) informed Nelson that she was entitled to monthly disability 
income benefits (SSDIB) beginning August 1991. (R. 8). SSA 
informed Nelson that she would receive her October 1992 benefits' 
check in November 1992 and that she would receive a check for 
$355 each month thereafter while she remained disabled. SSA also 
advised Nelson that it had not yet determined the amount of her 
retroactive benefits for August 1991 through September 1992, as 
those SSDIB benefits would be reduced if she were found eligible 
for SSI benefits for those months. (R. 37). 
On October 22, 1992, SSA informed Nelson that she would be 
receiving a check for $4,918 for SSDIB for August 1991 through 
September 1992 "because [she] didn't get SSI money for August 
1991 through September 1992." (R. 40). Nelson's lump sum 
3 
retroactive SSDIB check was received in October 1992. In 
November, 1992, the Social Security Administration notified 
Nelson that she had been found eligible for SSI in July 1992 (the 
date of her application). (R. 42, 67) . 
On December 7, 1992, the Department of Human Services 
notified Nelson that the SSDIB lump sum payment had placed her 
household over its income limit. The Nelson household was, 
therefore, ineligible for Medicaid and financial assistance 
(AFDC) beginning November 1992. (R. 43). Nelson did not 
actually receive her SSI benefits until December 1992 when a 
retroactive SSI check for July through December 1992 was issued 
to her. 
Nelson requested an informal administrative hearing to 
challenge the agency's decision which made her household, 
including her son, ineligible for AFDC and Medicaid for several 
months. The State hearing officer upheld the position of the 
Department of Human Services. Nelson then filed an action in 
district court. The Second District Court, Judge Michael D. 
Lyon, granted summary judgement to the Department of Human 
Services and denied Nelson's motion for summary judgement. 
Nelson now seeks appellate review of the district court's final 
order upholding the denial of AFDC and Medicaid eligibility for 
4 
her son. 
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS 
Joie Nelson was receiving Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) and family medical assistance for herself and her 
son in July 1992, when she applied for both Social Security 
Disability Insurance Benefits (SSDIB) and Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) on July 28, 1992. (R. 13, R. 42). In a letter dated 
October 17, 1992 Nelson was informed by the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) that she had been approved for SSDIB 
benefits as of August 1991 at an ongoing monthly benefit rate of 
$355.00. (R. 8, R. 37). Nelson was further notified by SSA in a 
letter dated October 22, 1992, that she would receive a lump sum 
payment that month representing retroactive SSDIB benefits 
totaling $4,918.00 for the time period of August 1991 through 
September 1992, and a monthly check of $355.00 in SSDIB benefits. 
(R. 11, R. 40). 
In October 1992, Nelson received the lump sum in the amount 
of $4,918.00 representing the retroactive SSDIB payments for 
which she was qualified. (R. 46, R. 57). On October 27, 1992, 
Nelson delivered to her DHS caseworker at the Ogden Office of 
Family Support (OFS) copies of the SSA notice finding her 
eligible for SSDIB. (R. 67). On November 2, 1992, Nelson 
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delivered to her DHS caseworker a computer printout from SSA 
showing that she became eligible for SSI in July 1992 with 
development pending. (R. 67). 
On December 7, 1992, Nelson was notified by her caseworker 
that she and her son were ineligible for AFDC and Medicaid 
benefits from November 1992 through October 1993. (R. 43, R. 67). 
Receipt of the SSDIB lump sum payment had resulted in the Nelson 
household exceeding the minimum income level for AFDC and 
Medicaid, thus disqualifying her family unit from continuing to 
receive those benefits for several months. (R. 43, 57-58) . The 
agency's decision in this regard was based upon AFDC and Medicaid 
policy addressing lump sum payments. (R. 57-62) . 
Nelson then began receiving SSI benefits in December 1992, 
after being notified of the approval of her SSI application 
effective July 1992. (R. 58). On December 9, 1992, Nelson 
delivered to her DHS caseworker an updated computer printout from 
SSA showing her SSI eligibility effective July 1992, a recurring 
monthly SSI amount of $89.00 (federal) and $5.00 (state) and an 
underpayment of SSI benefits in the amount of $174.00 (federal) 
and $15.00 (state). (R. 67-68). 
On December 29, 1992, Nelson appeared at a fair hearing to 
contest her son's loss of eligibility for AFDC and Medicaid. (R. 
6 
46). A hearing decision and order were issued on June 4, 1993, 
affirming the agency's decision. (R. 45-56). The hearing 
decision was reviewed on appeal and affirmed by the director of 
the Office of Administrative Hearings on April 7, 1995. (R. 57-
62). Nelson filed a case in Second District Court challenging 
the agency's determination. Judge Michael Lyon granted summary 
judgement in favor of DHS. (R. 139-140). 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS 
Persons with disabilities may seek Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) cash assistance and Social Security Disability 
Insurance Benefits (SSDIB) from the Social Security 
Administration (SSA). Additionally, they may seek AFDC financial 
assistance and Medicaid coverage from their designated State 
agency. Social Security benefits and AFDC and Medicaid are 
separate programs, authorized and regulated by separate laws, and 
administered by separate agencies. 
Congress has created financial (AFDC) and medical (Medicaid) 
coverage for disabled and needy individuals to be paid for with a 
combination of federal and state funds. Consistent with 
Congressional objectives and state statutes, the Department of 
Human Services determines who will receive assistance based upon 
the need of all who may be eligible. It is reasonable and 
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appropriate for the agency to distribute scarce public funds by 
rendering ineligible those who have accumulated assets from which 
they could provide for the costs of their own care. 
In 1981, Congress enacted a "lump sum" rule for the purpose 
of requiring AFDC households to utilize certain lump sum amounts 
to meet their daily living needs with lump sum monies, rather 
than with taxpayer dollars, for the period of calculated 
ineligibility. For AFDC and categorically needy Medicaid 
recipients, the receipt of certain lump sum amounts is treated as 
income for the month the lump sum is received. The "lump sum" 
rule results in an AFDC and Medicaid household unit becoming 
ineligible for those benefits for the number of months equal to 
the amount of the lump sum divided by the household's standard of 
need. In most situations, application of the lump sum rule 
causes hardships to recipients who may have large accrued bills 
which they would like to pay with their lump sum monies. 
However, Congress wished to create an incentive for AFDC 
recipients of lump sums to budget such sums for monthly 
necessities and to eliminate the incentive to spend the money all 
at once. 
An SSDIB lump sum payment is included as a lump sum within 
the AFDC "lump sum" rule. Receipt of an SSDIB lump sum award is 
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treated as income to an AFDC household in the month in which it 
is received, not the months in which the AFDC household was 
eligible to receive the award. Similarly, the receipt of SSI 
benefits are treated as received by an SSI recipient in the month 
in which they are received, not the month for which the recipient 
was eligible for those benefits. 
Federal law excludes an individual from an AFDC household 
for the period of time for which SSI benefits are received by 
that individual. Nelson was not an SSI recipient until December 
1992 when she received her SSI benefits' check. By December 
1992, Nelson and her child had already been disqualified from the 
AFDC and Medicaid programs as a result of her SSDIB retroactive 
lump sum award. The State of Utah's interpretation of applicable 
federal laws conforms with that of the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services. The Secretary's interpretation of complex 
federal regulations in the Social Security area must be given 
deference by reviewing courts 
ARgVNSNT 
I. NELSON HAD NOT ACTUALLY RECEIVED SSI BENEFITS 
UNTIL DECEMBER 1992 WHEN SHE HAD POSSESSION AND 
CONTROL OF THOSE FUNDS. CONSEQUENTLY, SHE WAS NOT 
RECEIVING SSI BENEFITS IN NOVEMBER 1992 WHEN HER 
SSDIB LUMP SUM PAYMENT MADE HER HOUSEHOLD 
INELIGIBLE FOR AFDC AND MEDICAID ASSISTANCE 
9 
A. General Background: SSDIB and SSI Benefits 
Persons with disabilities may seek Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) cash assistance and Social Security Disability 
Insurance Benefits (SSDIB) through the Social Security 
Administration. The two programs share a common definition of 
disability but have separate funding sources. The SSDIB program 
is an insurance program funded by joint worker/employee 
contributions while the worker is employed. To qualify for 
SSDIB, the applicant must have worked the requisite number of 
quarters and be insured at the time the disability began. On the 
other hand, SSI is an income maintenance program and is available 
to any qualified blind, disabled, or elderly person, regardless 
of work history. 
An applicant for SSI benefits is entitled to those benefits 
as of the first day of the month in which he or she satisfies all 
eligibility requirements and has applied for benefits. See 20 
C.F.R. §§ 416.330, 416.335 (1992). Yet, after a person applies 
for SSI benefits, the SSA takes a significant period of time to 
determine the applicant's eligibility and to begin making 
payments. This period of time--between the first date of SSI 
eligibility and the date of the first SSI payment--is referred to 
as the "determination period." Once a person is deemed eligible 
10 
for SSI benefits, he or she initially receives a retroactive lump 
sum payment for all benefits accrued during the determination 
period. During the SSI determination period, some SSI 
applicants apply for and receive AFDC payments. If an applicant 
is subsequently determined eligible for SSI benefits, the SSA 
deducts from its initial retroactive lump-sump SSI payment an 
amount equal to the amount of AFDC aid received by that 
individual during the determination period. See generally 42 
U.S.C.S. §§ 1382(b) (1993), 1382a(b) (1993 & Supp. 1996); 20 
C.F.R. §§ 416.1120, 416.1123; 416.1124(c)(2) (1992). The 
rationale for this deduction is to prevent a public assistance 
recipient from benefitting from both the SSI and the AFDC program 
for the same period of time. 
B. general B3Ckg3TQ\mc3; AFPC frying) Sum Rule 
The AFDC program is a public assistance scheme established 
by federal statute.1 See 42 U.S.C.S. § 601-615 (1985 & Supp. 
1996). Under the program, the federal government makes grants to 
*On August 22, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996), effectively repealing the 
AFDC program and replacing it with the Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families (TANF) program. The discussion of the AFDC 
program herein is based upon the law as it existed at the time 
this case arose. 
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partially fund participating State programs that provide cash 
assistance to families with needy, dependent children. Although 
the program is funded jointly by the federal and state 
governments, it is administered by the States. To receive grants 
from the federal government, a State must submit an AFDC plan to 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) which conforms 
to both statutory and regulatory requirements. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 
602 (1985 & Supp. 1996). 
The Medicaid program was established by Congress in 1965 as 
Title XIX of the Social Security Act "for the purpose of 
providing federal financial assistance to States that choose to 
reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons." 
tfeyyjff v, McRaS/ 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980). It is a program 
designed to make medical services for the needy more generally 
available. 
A participating state must provide Medicaid coverage to 
"categorically needy" persons. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 
1396a(a)(10)(A)(i) (1993). The "categorically needy"--a group 
that includes dependent children as well as aged, blind, or 
disabled adults--receive both cash payments and Medicaid 
coverage; however, in order to be eligible for this assistance, 
both their income and resources must be below limits set by the 
12 
Department of Health and Human Services. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 
416.1201; 416.1205; 416.1210 (1992). 
The Nelson household qualified for AFDC and therefore also 
qualified for Medicaid as a "categorically needy" household. 42 
U.S.C.S. § 1396a(a) (10) (A) (1993 & Supp. 1996). However, AFDC and 
Medicaid eligibility must be reviewed monthly to assure that the 
household's income and resources do not exceed the requirements 
set by Utah's AFDC and Medicaid programs. 
The lump sum rule for determining an AFDC recipient's income 
was added to the AFDC program by Section 402(a)(17) of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA). See 42 
U.S.C.S. § 602(a) (17) (1985). The lump sum regulation at 45 
C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(F)(1992), which was applied to Nelson, 
provides: 
When the AFDC assistance unit's income, after applying 
applicable disregards, exceeds the State need standard 
for the family because of receipt of nonrecurring 
earned or unearned lump sum income (including for AFDC, 
Title II2 and other retroactive monthly benefits, and 
payments in the nature of a windfall, e.g., 
inheritances or lottery winnings, personal injury and 
worker compensation awards, to the extent that it is 
not earmarked and used for the purpose for which it is 
paid, i.e., monies for back medical bills resulting 
2Title II refers to that Title of the Social Security Act 
(the Act) which sets forth the Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and 
Disability Insurance Benefits (SSDIB) of the Act. 
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from accidents or injury, funeral and burial costs, 
replacement or repair of resources, etc.), the family 
will be ineligible for aid for the full number of 
months derived by dividing the sum of the lump sum 
income and other income by the monthly need standard 
for a family of that size. Any income remaining from 
this calculation is income in the first month following 
the period of ineligibility. The period of 
ineligibility shall begin with the month of receipt of 
the nonrecurring income of, at State option, as late as 
the corresponding payment month. [3] 
The foregoing regulation requires that a lump sum SSDIB 
award be considered "unearned income" and taken into account in 
determining if a recipient and his or her household will continue 
to be eligible for AFDC assistance. The lump sum rule will 
apply when an AFDC family member receives in a month a lump sum 
of non-recurring income which, together with the family's other 
income, exceeds the state's standard of need for that family for 
that month. 
In the case of the Nelson household, the State divided 
$4,918--the SSDIB benefits received by Nelson in October 1992--by 
the standard of need of her household size--$431--resulting in 
her family becoming ineligible for AFDC and Medicaid for several 
months, commencing in November 1992. Even if the family spends 
3This federal regulation is incorporated into Utah policy at 
Office of Family Support policy manual, Volume II, §§ 122 and 
438. (Addendum A). 
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the lump sum immediately and the family has no funds for support, 
the disqualification period continues as if the family had 
budgeted the lump sum funds to cover their standard needs budget. 
In essence, the lump sum rule is intended to force the family to 
use its lump sum payment to replace its AFDC grant during the 
proscribed period. See Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 417-
418 (1988); Smith v. Concannon. 938 F.2d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 
1991) . 
State plans for AFDC must include a provision that if an 
individual is 
receiving [SSI] benefits under Title XVI . . . , then 
fpr the period for which such benefit? $tre received. 
. , such individual shall not be regarded as a member 
of the family for purposes of determining the amount of 
benefits of the family under this Title [42 U.S.C.S. § 
601 et. seq.1 and his income and resources shall not be 
counted as income and resources of a family under this 
Title. . . 
(emphasis added). 42 U.S.C.S. § 602 (a) (24) (Supp. 1996). See 
also 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a) (1) (ii) (1992) . 
Nelson asserts, based upon the foregoing AFDC State plan 
requirement, that she should have been excluded from the AFDC 
household (which included her and her son) in October 1992 when 
she received her SSDIB lump sum award. She argues that she was 
an SSI recipient in October 1992 because, in December 1992, SSA 
15 
determined her to be SSI eligible retroactive to July 1992. It 
is her position that her retroactive July 1992 SSI eligibility 
should have caused her to be excluded from her household in 
October 1992 when her SSDIB lump sum income was received. To 
assert that position, Nelson strains the plain language of 42 
U.S.C.S. § 602(a)(24) and disregards the statutory interpretation 
of both the federal and state agencies. 
c. SSI Benefits are not "Received" Until a Recipient 
frag Actually Obtained the Benefit Check frgm tfre 
Social Security Administration 
The undisputed facts in this case are that Nelson was not 
even informed of her SSI eligibility until November 1992. In 
addition, the SSI benefit check, in a liquidated sum, was not 
legally available to her until December 1992. By that date, DHS 
had already determined that her lump sum SSDIB award was 
countable "income" and had disqualified her household from AFDC 
and Medicaid commencing November 1, 1992--the month after she 
received her SSDIB award.4 
4The Secretary of Health and Human Services has interpreted 
income and resources to be available to an applicant or recipient 
"when actually available and when the applicant or recipient has 
a legal interest in a liquidated sum and has the legal ability to 
make such sum available for support and maintenance." 45 C.F.R. 
§ 233.20(a) (3) (ii) (D) (1992) . 
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Nelson's argument requires this Court to analyze the meaning 
of 42 U.S.C.S. § 602(a)(24) when it excludes, for AFDC 
eligibility purposes, the income and resources of a household 
member who "is receiving benefits under Title XVI" [SSI benefits] 
for the period for which such benefits "are received." The 
issue becomes the meaning of the words "receiving" and 
"received." Nelson argues that she "received" SSI benefits from 
the date on which she was determined to have been eligible for 
those benefits, not from the date on which those cash benefits 
were actually tendered to her. 
The principles of statutory construction applicable to this 
issue are clear. "We look first to the plain language of the 
statute to discern the legislative intent. . 'Only when we find 
ambiguity in the statute's plain language need we seek guidance 
from the legislative history and relevant policy 
considerations.'" City pf SPUtfr Sfrlt frfrk^, et, &l
 f vt Salt Lfrke 
County, No. 960325 (Utah Oct. 18, 1996); Gohler v. Wood. 919 P.2d 
561, 562-563 (Utah 1996). 
A review of the plain language of the statute in question 
reveals no ambiguity. The words "receiving" and "received" are 
clear and unambiguous. Black's Law Dictionary defines "receive" 
as "to take into possession and control; accept custody of; 
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collect." Black's Law Dictionary 1268 (6th ed. 1990). Clearly, 
Nelson did not take her SSI benefits into her possession and 
control until December 1992 when she actually accepted custody of 
them or collected them from the Social Security Administration. 
The term "receive" is not of uncertain meaning and is used in 
many statutes. If Congress had meant for an AFDC household 
member's income and resources to be excluded as of the date he or 
she becomes eligible for SSI, Congress would have written 42 
U.S.C.S. §602(a)(24) to reflect that intent and meaning. 
Clearly, Congress provided that the exclusion in Section 
602(a)(24) applies only uif an individual is receiving" SSI 
benefits. The exclusion does not apply as of the date an 
individual is determined to have been eligible for SSI benefits. 
Because 42 U.S.C.S. § 602(a)(24) is unambiguous on its face, no 
inquiry into the legislative history or policy concerns 
underlying the statutory terms is necessary. However, exploring 
the policy considerations behind the statute, it remains clear 
that Nelson's arguments must fail. 
D. PHS's Interpretation of 42 U,S,C,S, s 6Q2(s0(24) 
is Consistent with Acceptable Congressional and 
Agency Objectives and Policy Concerns 
Nelson cites a 1980 Pennsylvania decision, Gleim v. Com. 
Dept. of Public Welfare. 409 A.2d 951 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980), which 
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analyzed the language of 42 U.S.C.S. § 602 (a) (24). Examining 
facts similar to those in this case, the Pennsylvania court 
reviewed whether Gleim was a "recipient" of SSI within the 
meaning of the statute when the State agency was determining if 
he was included in a household for AFDC purposes. The court 
noted that it is "axiomatic that a statute may not be construed 
to reach an absurd or illogical result, and that in the absence 
of special intent statutory language must be given its clear and 
plain meaning." Gleim, 409 A.2d at 952. 
However, rather than focusing on the clear meaning of the 
word "receive," the Gleim court rejected the State's argument 
that an SSI recipient does not become a recipient until he or she 
actually receives SSI monies, because the court opined that such 
an interpretation could lead to illogical and inconsistent 
results. 
DPW would have us hold that an individual is not a 
"recipient" until he is in actual receipt of official 
notice of eligibility and the attendant payments. 
Thus, two persons might be declared eligible on the 
same day, . . . but because of processing delays at the 
SSA level become "recipients" under the statute on 
widely varying dates. 
filfiim, 409 A.2d at 952. 
The court in Gleim maintained that, "as of the date which 
SSA declares the individual eligible to receive SSI, he shall be 
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considered a 'recipient' under the Act. . ." (emphasis added), 
filfiinif 409 A. 2d at 953, n.3. In essence, the Gleim Court ruled 
that the term "receive" used in 42 U.S.C.S. § 602(a) (24) means 
"eligible to receive." 
Later cases which have analyzed the meaning of Section 
602(a)(24) have not agreed with the tortured reasoning found in 
filfiim. In Pennsylvania v. United States. 752 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 
1984), Pennsylvania sued the federal government to recoup AFDC 
payments it had made to SSI eligible individuals between the date 
of their SSI eligibility and their actual receipt of SSI 
benefits. 5 
The U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services presented 
the federal agency's position that "Section 602(a) (24) is 
designed to prevent a person from receiving full benefits from 
both SSI and AFDC simultaneously ('double-dipping'), . . . , and 
that [the] policy of deducting AFDC payments from SSI benefits 
prevents double-dipping." Pennsylvania. 752 F.2d at 799. The 
5When SSA issues retroactive SSI benefits to a recipient, it 
reduces the retroactive award by the amount of AFDC benefits 
provided that individual by the AFDC program. The amount of that 
reduction is not paid over to the State agency which participates 
in the AFDC program. In Pennsylvania v. United States. 
Pennsylvania argued that the federal government's failure to 
return these AFDC payments to the State was illegal. 
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Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with that reasoning. 
The court also found plausible the Secretary's position 
which had been adopted by the district court: 
That Section [42 U.S.C.S. § 602(a) (24)] speaks only to 
an individual's eligibility for AFDC benefits and 
renders an individual ineligible for such payments when 
he is %receiving' [SSI] benefits under subchapter XVI 
of this chapter.' (emphasis added). It is clear that, 
during the SSI determination period, an applicant does 
not receive SSI benefits, although he may later be 
found eligible to receive such benefits. . . . Thus, 
42 [U.S.C.S.] § 602(a)(24) does not restrict AFDC 
payments during the determination period, nor does it 
require the adjustment suggested by plaintiffs. It 
addresses only the state's obligation with respect to 
AFDC eligibility when an individual is receiving SSI 
benefits. 
Pennsylvania, 752 F.2d at 799. 
The court also found the Secretary's implementation of 
Section 602(a)(24) to be consistent with other parts of the AFDC 
and SSI statutory schemes. See also West v. Bowen. 879 F.2d 1122 
(3d Cir. 1989). 
As noted by the policy unit for the DHS (R. 50), Nelson's 
assertion, carried to its logical extreme, would result in an 
applicant for SSI being declared ineligible for AFDC benefits 
during the SSI determination period. The position of the 
Secretary of HHS is that the purpose of Section 602(a)(24) is to 
prevent an SSI recipient from benefitting from both the AFDC 
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program and the SSI program. Utah DHS's interpretation of 
Section 602(a) (24) precludes a recipient from obtaining double 
benefits as intended by Congress and the Secretary. 
If Nelson's interpretation is accepted by this Court, then, 
in order to avoid an SSI applicant from benefitting from both 
programs, the State may have to assume that an SSI applicant is 
also a recipient and thus ineligible for AFDC during the SSI 
determination period. 
If the policy were applied as [Nelson] suggests, [DHS] 
would then deny AFDC benefits to someone whose SSI 
application had been pending for 2 years because if SSI 
is approved, the client would be an SSI recipient in 
those months. [DHS] would also compute overpayments for 
SSI months if any AFDC was received in those months, 
even though no SSI funds were issued in those months, 
this would not benefit our clients, 
(R. 50). 
The foregoing result would not promote the financial well-
being of disabled poor people who seek SSI eligibility while 
receiving AFDC assistance from a State. The interpretation of 
Section 602(a)(24) which is espoused by both the Secretary of HHS 
and by DHS promotes the unambiguous meaning of the word "receive" 
and furthers the Congressional intent to prevent an individual 
from benefitting from both the SSI and AFDC programs 
simultaneously. 
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II. THE INTERPRETATION ACCORDED SECTION 602(a)(24) BY 
THE SECRETARY OF HHS IS ENTITLED TO DEFERENCE BY 
THIS COURT 
When reviewing an agency's construction of a statute, this 
Court's role is to determine first, "whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue." Skandalis v. 
ROWS, 14 F.3d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1994), (citing Chevron U.S.A.. 
Inct v, Natural Resources Defense Councili Inc, 467 u.s. 837, 
842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781 (1984)). If so, then the Court must 
"give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." 
Skandalis. 14 F.3d at 179. If, on the other hand, the statute is 
silent or ambiguous, deference is given to an agency's 
interpretation of a statute which it administers. Id. 
It is a well settled principle of law "that a reviewing 
court must accord substantial deference to an agency's 
interpretation of a statute that the agency is directed by 
Congress to implement." Pennsylvania v. United States. 752 F.2d 
795, 798 (3d Cir. 1984), see alSQ, West V, BPWen, 879 F.2d 1122, 
1124 (3d Cir. 1989) (the reviewing court is bound to defer to the 
Secretary's interpretation, if that interpretation is reasonable 
and based on a permissible construction of the statute); 
Skandalis v. Rowe, 14 F.3d 173, 178 (2nd Cir. 1994) (an agency's 
interpretation of a statute that the agency administers is 
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entitled to considerable deference; a court may not substitute 
its own reading unless the agency's interpretation is 
unreasonable); Martin v. Pav-Saver Mfg. Co., 933 F.2d 528, 530 
(7th Cir. 1991) (an agency's interpretation is entitled to great 
deference by the judiciary). 
This broad deference is even more warranted when the 
interpretation "concerns a %complex and highly technical 
regulatory program,' in which the identification and 
classification of relevant "criteria necessarily require 
significant expertise and entail the exercise of judgment 
grounded in policy concerns.'" Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 
No. 93-120, slip op. at 8 (U.S. June 24, 1994), 114 S.Ct. 2381, 
2387 (1994), (quoting Pauley vT PethEnergy Mineg, Inc., 501 U.S. 
680, 697 (199D); see also, Strickland vt Ccmm'r, Maine Pep't cf 
Agrjc, v. Secretary, U,S, Pept, of Agric, 96 F.3d 542, 547 (1st 
Cir. 1996) (food-stamp case stating that deference to an agency's 
interpretation is particularly appropriate in complex and highly 
specialized areas where the regulatory net has been intricately 
woven). 
The AFDC and SSI programs, and the interplay between them, 
certainly comprise complex and highly regulatory programs. This 
point has been illustrated specifically by the Supreme Court when 
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it stated Mt]he Social Security Act is among the most intricate 
ever drafted by Congress. . . . Perhaps appreciating the 
complexity of what it had wrought, Congress conferred on the 
Secretary exceptionally broad authority to prescribe standards 
for applying certain sections of the Act." Schweiker v. Gray 
Panthers. 453 U.S. 34, 43, 101 S.Ct. 2633, 2640 (1981). 
Many additional Social Security Act cases support the view 
that deference is accorded to the Secretary's interpretation. 
As the Supreme Court and this Court have emphasized 
frequently, our role is not to impose upon [the Social 
Security Administration] our own interpretation of the 
Social Security legislation. Rather, because Congress 
has delegated to the Secretary the responsibility for 
administering the complex programs, we must defer to 
her construction, as long as it is reasonable and not 
arbitrary and capricious. 
Wheeler v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 1986); see also. 
Visiting Nurse Ass'n of North Shore. Inc. v. Bullen. 93 F.3d 997, 
1002 (1st Cir. 1996). 
The Secretary of HHS has consistently asserted the position 
that an SSI recipient does not "receive" that benefit until the 
money is actually in the hands of the recipient. By an Action 
Transmittal, ACF-AT-93-20, the Department of Health and Human 
Services has stated that 42 U.S.C.S. § 602(a)(24) is "applicable 
beginning on the date SSI payments are actually received." (R. 
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125). In addition, it is the understanding of Utah DHS officials 
that Section 602(a)(24) applies to an individual only upon the 
actual receipt of SSI payments. (R. 85). That State 
understanding has been confirmed by the Deputy Director of the 
Office of Family Assistance, Department of Health and Human 
Services who has stated that Section 602(a)(24) is "applicable 
beginning on the date that Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
payments under Title XVI of the Act are actually received, and 
not on the date SSI eligibility begins." (R. 129). 
In evaluating the weight given specifically to agency 
interpretations, courts have held that deference is given to an 
agency's interpretation of a statute by using such devices as 
Action Transmittals. This deference is upheld unless the 
interpretation is judged unreasonable, or it contradicts an 
earlier position by the agency. See, e.g. . Foley v. Suter. et. 
al.. Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) U 37,695 (N.D. 111. 1988) 
(1988 WL 235571, *3); Wilkes v. Gomez. 32 F.3d 1324, 1329 (8th 
Cir. 1994), cert, denied. 115 S.Ct. 1431 (1995). 
In the present case, the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services' interpretation of 42 U.S.C.S. § 602(a)(24) represents a 
reasonable accommodation of the intersection between the AFDC and 
SSI programs. In fulfilling her charge to administer these 
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highly complex and overlapping programs, the Secretary has 
elected to implement the policy which best reconciles potential 
overlaps. The Secretary's policy is that SSI funds are not 
received until the recipient physically has collected them. This 
interpretation is consistent with the plain language of Section 
602(a)(24). Moreover, this interpretation "is consistent with 
other parts of the AFDC and SSI statutory schemes." Pennsylvania 
v. United States. 752 F.2d 795, 799 (3d Cir. 1984). In the 
complex and interwoven areas of Social Security and AFDC, the 
interpretation given to Section 602(a)(24) by federal and state 
officials should be given deference by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, DHS's decision denying AFDC and 
Medicaid eligibility to the Nelson household should be affirmed. 
DATED this 8th day of November, 1996. 
LINDA LUINSTRA 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
GRANTS FOR DEPENDENT CHILDREN 42 USCS § 602 
(17) provide that if a child or relative applying for or receiving aid to 
families with dependent children, or any other person whose need the 
State considers when determining the income of a family, receives in any 
month an amount of earned or unearned income which, together with 
all other income for that month not excluded under paragraph (8), 
exceeds the State's standard of need applicable to the family of which he 
is a member— 
(A) such amount of income shall be considered income to such 
individual in the month received, and the family of which such person 
is a member shall be ineligible for aid under the plan for the whole 
number of months that equals (i) the sum of such amount and all 
other income received in such month, not excluded under paragraph 
(8), divided by (ii) the standard of need applicable to such family, and 
(B) any income remaining (which amount is less than the applicable 
monthly standard) shall be treated as income received in the first 
month following the period of ineligibility specified in subparagraph 
•(A); 
except that the State may at its option recalculate the period of 
ineligibility otherwise determined under subparagraph (A) (but only with 
respect to the remaining months in such period) in any one or more of 
the following cases: (i) an event occurs which, had the family been 
receiving aid under the State plan for the month of the occurrence, 
would result in a change in the amount of aid payable for such month 
under the plan, or (ii) the income received has become unavailable to 
the members of the family for reasons that were beyond the control of 
such members, or (iii) the family incurs, becomes responsible for, and 
pays medical expenses (as allowed by the State) in a month of ineligibil-
ity determined under subparagraph (A) (which expenses may be consid-
ered as an offset against the amount of income received in the first 
month of such ineligibility); 
(18) provide that no family shall be eligible for aid under the plan for 
any month if, for that month, the total income of the family (other than 
payments under the plan), without application of paragraph (8), other 
than paragraph (8)(A)(v), exceeds 185 percent of the State's standard of 
need for a family of the same composition, except that in determining 
the total income of the family the State may exclude any earned income 
of a dependent child who is a full-time student, in such amounts and for 
such period of time (not to exceed 6 months) as the State may 
determine; 
(19) provide— 
(A) that every individual, as a condition of eligibility for aid under 
this part [42 USCS §§ 601 et seq.], shall register for manpower 
services, training, employment, and other employment-related activi-
ties (including employment search, not to exceed eight weeks in total 
in each year) with the Secretary of Labor as provided by regulations 
issued by him, unless such individual is— 
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tending (in good standing) an institution of higher education (as defined in section 
481(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965) [20 USCS § 1088(a)], or a school or 
course of vocational or technical training (not less than half time) consistent with the 
individual's employment goals, and is making satisfactory progress in such institu-
tion, school, or course, at the time he or she would otherwise commence participa-
tion in the program under this section, such attendance may constitute satisfactory 
participation in the program (by that caretaker or child) so long as it continues and 
is consistent with such goals; 
(ii) any other activities in which an individual described in clause (i) participates may 
not be permitted to interfere with the school or training described in that clause; 
(iii) the costs of such school or training shall not constitute federally reimbursable 
expenses for purposes of section 403 [42 USCS § 603]; and 
(iv) the costs of day care, transportation, and other services which are necessary (as 
determined by the State agency) for such attendance in accordance with section 402(g) 
[subsec. (g) of this section] are eligible for Federal reimbursement; 
(G) that— 
(i) if an individual who is required by the provisions of this paragraph to participate 
in the program or who is so required by reason of the State's having exercised the 
option under subparagraph (D) fails without good cause to participate in the program 
or refuses without good cause to accept employment in which such individual is able 
to engage which is offered through the public employment offices of the State, or is 
otherwise offered by an employer if the offer of such employer is determined to be a 
bona fide offer of employment— 
(I) the needs of such individual (whether or not section 407 [42 USCS § 607] ap-
plies) shall not be taken into account in making the determination with respect to 
his or her family under paragraph (7) of this subsection, and if such individual is 
a parent or other caretaker relative, payments of aid for any dependent child in 
the family in the form of payments of the type described in section 406(b)(2) [42 
USCS § 606(b)(2)] (which in such a case shall be without regard to clauses (A) 
through (D) thereof) will be made unless the State agency, after making reason-
able efforts, is unable to locate an appropriate individual to whom such payments 
can be made; and 
(II) if such individual is a member of a family which is eligible for aid to families 
with dependent children by reason of section 407 [42 USCS § 607], and his or her 
spouse is not participating in the program, the needs of such spouse shall also not 
be taken into account in making such determination; 
(ii) any sanction described in clause (1) shall continue— 
(I) in the case of the individual's first failure to comply, until the failure to comply 
ceases; 
(II) in the case of the individual's second failure to comply, until the failure to 
comply ceases or 3 months (whichever is longer); and 
(III) in the case of any subsequent failure to comply, until the failure to comply 
ceases or 6 months (whichever is longer); 
(iii) the State will promptly remind any individual whose failure to comply has 
continued for 3 months, in writing, of the individual's option to end the sanction by 
terminating such failure; and 
(iv) no sanction shall be imposed under this subparagraph— 
(I) on the basis of the refusal of an individual described in subparagraph 
(C)(iii)(II) to accept employment, if the employment would require such individual 
to work more than 20 hours a week, or 
(II) on the basis of the refusal of an individual to participate in the program or 
accept employment, if child care (or day care for any incapacitated individual liv-
ing in the same home as a dependent child) is necessary for an individual to 
participate in the program or accept employment, such care is not available, and 
the State agency fails to provide such care; and 
(H) the State agency may require a participant in the program to accept a job only if 
such agency assures that the family of such participant will experience no net loss of cash 
income resulting from acceptance of the job; and any costs incurred by the State agency 
as a result of this subparagraph shall be treated as expenditures with respect to which 
section 403(a)(1) or 403(a)(2) [42 USCS § 603(a)(1) or (2)] applies;, 
U0H23) [Unchanged] 
(24) provide that if an individual is receiving benefits under title XVI or his costs in a foster 
family home or child-care institution are covered by the foster care maintenance payments 
42 USCS § 602 PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 
being made to his or her minor parent as provided in section 475(4)(B) [42 USCS 
t § 675(4)(B)], then, for the period for which such benefits are received or such costs are so 1
 covered, such individual shall not be regarded as a member of a family for purposes of 
determining the amount of the benefits of the family under this title [42 USCS §§601 et 
seq.] and his income and resources shall not be counted as income and resources of a fam-
ily under this title [42 USCS §§ 601 et seq.]; 
(25) [Unchanged] 
(26) provide that, as a condition of eligibility for aid, each applicant or recipient will be 
required— 
(A) to assign the State any rights to support from any other person such applicant may 
have (i) in his own behalf or in behalf of any other family member for whom the ap-
plicant is applying for or receiving aid, and (ii) which have accrued at the time such as-
signment is executed; 
(B) to cooperate with the State (i) in establishing the paternity of a child born out of 
wedlock with respect to whom aid is claimed, and (ii) in obtaining support payments for 
such applicant and for a child with respect to whom such aid is claimed, or in obtaining 
any other payments or property due such applicant or such child, unless (in either case) 
such applicant or recipient is found to have good cause for refusing to cooperate as 
1
 determined by the State agency in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, 
which standards shall take into consideration the best interests of the child on whose 
behalf aid is claimed; and that, if the relative with whom a child is living is found to be 
ineligible because of failure to comply with the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and 
(B) of this paragraph, any aid for which such child is eligible will be provided in the form 
of protective payments as described in section 406(b)(2) [42 USCS § 606(b)(2)] (without 
regard to clauses (A) through (D) of such section) unless the State agency, after making 
reasonable efforts, is unable to locate an appropriate individual to whom such payments 
can be made; and 
(C) to cooperate with the State in identifying, and providing information to assist the 
State in pursuing, any third party who may be liable to pay for care and services avail-
able under the State's plan for medical assistance under title XIX [42 USCS §§ 1396 et 
seq,], unless such individual has good cause for refusing to cooperate as determined by 
the State agency in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, which 
standards shall take into consideration the best interests of the individuals involved; but 
the State shall not be subject to any financial penalty in the administration or enforce-
ment of this subparagraph as a result of any monitoring, quality control, or auditing 
requirements; 
(27M29) [Unchanged] 
(30) at the option of the State, provide for the establishment and operation, in accordance 
with an (initial and annually updated) advance automated data processing planning docu-
ment approved under subsection (e), of an automated statewide management information 
system designed effectively and efficiently, to assist management in the administration of the 
State plan for aid to families with dependent children approved under this part [42 USCS 
§§ 601 et seq.], so as (A) to control and account for (i) all the factors in the total eligibility 
determination process under such plan for aid (including but not limited to (I) identifiable 
correlation factors (such as social security numbers, names, dates of birth, home addresses, 
and mailing addresses (including postal ZIP codes), of all applicants and recipients of such 
aid and the relative with whom any child who is such an applicant or recipient is living) to 
assure sufficient compatibility among the systems of different jurisdictions to permit periodic 
screening to determine whether an individual is or has been receiving benefits from more 
than one jurisdiction, (II) checking records of applicants and recipients of such aid on a 
periodic basis with other agencies, both intra- and inter-State, for determination and 
verification of eligibility and payment pursuant to requirements imposed by other provisions 
of this Act), (ii) the costs, quality, and delivery of funds and services furnished to applicants 
for and recipients of such aid, (B) to notify the appropriate officials of child support, food 
stamp, social service, and medical assistance programs approved under title XIX [42 USCS 
§§ 1396 et seq.] whenever the case becomes ineligible or the amount of aid or services is 
changed, and (C) to provide for security against unauthorized access to, or use of, the data 
in such system; 
(31) provide that, in making the determination for any month under paragraph (7), the State 
agency shall take into consideration so much of the income of the dependent child's step-
parent living in the same home as such child as exceeds the sum of (A) the first $90 of the 
total of such stepparent's earned income for such month, (B) the State's standard of need 
under such plan for a family of the same composition as the stepparent and those other 
individuals living in the same household as the dependent child and claimed by such step-
parent as dependents for purposes of determining his Federal personal income tax liability 
§ 233.20 
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mental incapacity of a parent, or un-
employment of a principal earner, and 
(J) Living in the home of a parent or 
of certain relatives specified in the 
Act. 
(o) The parent(s) of a dependent 
child, a caretaker relative (other than 
a parent) of a dependent child, and, in 
certain situations, a parent's spouse. 
(iii) AB—for needy individual's 
under the plan who are blind. 
(iv) APTD—for needy individuals 
under the plan who are 18 years of age 
or older and permanently and totally 
disabled. 
(v) AABD—for needy individuals 
under the plan who are aged, blind, or 
18 years of age or older and perma-
nently and totally disabled. 
(3) Federal financial participation is 
available in assistance payments made 
for the entire month in accordance 
with the State plan if the individual 
was eligible for a portion of the 
month, provided that the individual 
was eligible on the date that the pay-
ment was made; except that where it 
has been determined that the State 
agency had previously denied assist-
ance to which the individual was enti-
tled. Federal financial participation 
will be provided in any corrective pay-
ment regardless of whether the indi-
vidual is eligible on the date that the 
corrective payment is made. 
(4) Federal financial participation is 
available in assistance payments 
which are continued in accordance 
with the State plan, for a temporary 
period during which the effects of an 
eligibility condition are being over-
come, e.g., blindness in AB, disability 
in APTD, physical or mental incapac-
ity, continued absence of a parent, or 
unemployment of a principal earner in 
AFDC. 
(5) Where changed circumstances or 
a hearing decision makes the individ-
ual ineligible for any assistance, or eli-
gible for a smaller amount of assist-
ance than was actually paid. Federal 
financial participation is available in 
excess payments to such individuals, 
for not more than one month follow-
ing the month in which the circum-
stances changed or the hearing deci-
sion was rendered. Federal financial 
participation is available where assist-
ance is required to be continued unad-
justed because a hearing has been re-
quested. 
t36 FR 3866. Feb. 27. 1971. as amended at 38 
FR 8744. Apr. 6. 1973; 39 FR 26912. Ju ly 24, 
1974; 40 FR 32958, Aug. 5. 1975; 47 FR 5674. 
Feb. 5. 1982; 47 FR 47828. Oct. 28, 1982; 51 
FR 9204. Mar. 18. 1986; 57 FR 30158. Ju ly 8. 
1992] 
§ 233.20 Need and amount of assistance. 
(a) Requirements for State Plans. A 
State Plan for OAA. AFDC, AB, 
APTD or AABD must, as specified 
below; 
(1) General (i) Provide that the de-
termination of need and amount of as-
sistance for all applicants and recipi-
ents will be made on an objective and 
equitable basis and all types of income 
will be taken into consideration in the 
same way except where otherwise spe-
cifically authorized by Federal statute 
and 
(ii) Provide that the needs, income, 
and resources of individuals receiving 
SSI benefits under title XVI, individ-
uals with respect to whom Federal 
foster care payments are made, indi-
viduals with respect to whom State or 
local foster care payments are made, 
individuals with respect to whom Fed-
eral adoption assistance payments are 
made, or individuals with respect to 
whom State or local adoption assist-
ance payments are made, for the 
period for which such benefits or pay-
ments are received, shall not be includ-
ed in determining the need and the 
amount of the assistance payment of 
an AFDC assistance unit; except that 
the needs, income, and resources of an 
individual with respect to whom Fed-
eral adoption assistance payments are 
made, or individuals with respect to 
whom State or local adoption assist-
ance payments are made are included 
in determining the need and the 
amount of the assistance payment for 
an AFDC assistance unit of which the 
individual would otherwise be regard-
ed as a member where the amount of 
the assistance payment that the unit 
would receive would not be reduced by 
including the needs, income, and re-
sources of such individual. Under this 
requirement, "individuals receiving 
SSI benefits under title XVI" include 
individuals receiving mandatory or op-
tional State supplementary payments 
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under section 1616(a) of the Social Se-
curity Act or under section 212 of 
Public Law 93-66, and "individuals 
with respect to whom Federal foster 
care payments are made" means a 
child with respect to whom Federal 
foster care maintenance payments 
under section 472(b) and defined in 
section 475(4)(A) of title IV-E of the 
Social Security Act are made, and a 
child whose costs in a foster family 
home or child care institution are cov-
ered by the Federal foster care main-
tenance payments made with respect 
to his or her minor parent under sec-
tions 472(h) and 475(4)(B) of title IV-
E. "Individuals with respect to whom 
Federal adoption assistance payments 
are made" means a child who receives 
payments made under an approved 
title IV-E plan based on an adoption 
assistance agreement between the 
State and the adoptive parents of a 
child with special needs, pursuant to 
sections 473 and 475(3) of the Social 
Security Act. 
(iii) For AFDC. when an individual 
who is required to be included in the 
assistance unit pursuant to 
§ 206.10(a)(l)(vii) is also required to be 
included in another assistance unit, 
those assistance units must be consoli-
dated, and treated as one assistance 
unit for purposes of determining eligi-
bility and the amount of payment. 
(iv) For AFDC, when a State learns 
of an individual who is required to be 
included in the assistance unit after 
the date he or she is required to be in-
cluded in the unit, the State must re-
determine the assistance unit's eligibil-
ity and payment amount, including 
the need, income, and resources of the 
individual. This redetermination must 
be retroactive to the date that the in-
dividual was required to be in the as-
sistance unit either through birth/ 
adoption or by becoming a member of 
the household. Any resulting overpay-
ment must be recovered or corrective 
payment made pursuant to 
§233.20(a)(13). 
(v) In determining need and the 
amount of payment for AFDC, all 
income and resources of an individual 
required to be in the assistance unit, 
but subject to sanction under § 250.34 
or because of an intentional program 
violation under the optional fraud con-
trol program implementing section 416 
of the Social Security Act. are consid-
ered available to the assistance unit to 
the same extent that they would be if 
the person were not subject to a sanc-
tion. However, the needs of the sanc-
tioned individual(s) are not consid-
ered. In accord with § 250.34(c), if a 
parent in an AFDC-UP case is sanc-
tioned pursuant to § 233.100(a)(5). the 
needs of the second parent are not 
taken into account in determining the 
family's need for assistance and the 
amount of the assistance payment 
unless the second parent is participat-
ing in the JOBS program. An individ-
ual required to be in an assistance unit 
pursuant to § 206.10(a)(l)(vii) but who 
fails to cooperate in meeting a condi-
tion of his or her eligibility for assist-
ance is a sanctioned individual whose 
needs, income, and resources are treat-
ed in the manner described above. 
(2) Standards of assistance, (i) Speci-
fy a statewide standard, expressed in 
money amounts, to be used in deter-
mining (a) the need of applicants and 
recipients and (6) the amount of the 
assistance payment. 
(ii) In the AFDC plan, provide that 
by July 1, 1969, the State's standard of 
assistance for the AFDC program will 
have been adjusted to reflect fully 
changes in living costs since such 
standards were established, and any 
maximums that the State imposes on 
the amount of aid paid to families will 
have been proportionately adjusted. 
In such adjustment a consolidation of 
the standard (i.e., combining of items) 
may not result in a reduction in the 
content of the standard. In the event 
the State is not able to meet need in 
full under the adjusted standard, the 
State may make ratable reductions in 
accordance with paragraph (a)(3)(viii) 
of this section. Nevertheless, if a State 
maintains a system of dollar maxi-
mums these maximums must be pro-
portionately adjusted in relation to 
the updated standards. 
(iii) Provide that the standard will 
be uniformly applied throughout the 
State except as provided under 
§ 239.54. 
(iv) Include the method used in de-
termining need and the amount of the 
assistance payment. For AFDC. the 
method must provide for rounding 
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down to the next lower whole dollar 
when the result of determining the 
standard of need or the payment 
amount is not a whole dollar. Prora-
tion under § 206.10(aX6)(i)(D) to de-
termine the amount of payment for 
the month of application must occur 
before rounding to determine the pay-
ment amount for that month. 
(v) If the State IV-A agency includes 
special need items in its standard: 
(A) Describe those that will be rec-
ognized and the circumstances under 
which they will be included, and 
(B) Provide that they will be consid-
ered for all applicants and recipients 
requiring them; except that: 
(7) Under APDC, work expenses and 
child care (or care of incapacitated 
adults living in the same home and re-
ceiving AFDC) resulting from employ-
ment or participation in either a 
CWEP or an employment search pro-
gram cannot be special needs, and 
(2) In a State which has a JOBS pro-
gram under Part 250, child care, trans-
portation, work-related expenses, 
other work-related supportive services, 
and the costs of education (including 
tuition, books, and fees) resulting from 
participation in JOBS (including par-
ticipation pursuant to §§250.46, 
250.47, and 250.48) or any other educa-
tion or training activity cannot be spe-
cial needs. 
(vi) For OAA, AB, APTD, or AABD, 
if the State chooses to establish the 
need of the individual on a basis that 
recognizes, as essential to his well-
being, the presence in the home of 
other needy individuals, (a) specify 
the persons whose needs will be in-
cluded in the individual's need, and (6) 
provide that the decision as to wheth-
er any individual will be recognized as 
essential to the recipient's well-being 
shall rest both with the recipient, and 
be supported and concurred in by the 
agency supervisory staff—a person of 
a higher position or authority than 
the first line caseworker or income 
maintenance intake employee. 
(vii) For AFDC, if the State chooses 
to establish the need of the individual 
on a basis that recognizes, as essential 
to his /her basic well-being, the pres-
ence in the home of other needy indi-
viduals, (a) specify the persons whose 
needs will be included in the individ-
ual's need, but limited to those individ-
uals who regularly provide at least one 
of the following benefits or services: 
(1) child care which enables a caretak-
er relative to work on a full-time basis 
outside the home, (2) care for an inca-
pacitated family member in the home, 
(3) child care that enables a caretaker 
relative to receive training on a full-
time basis (4) child care that enables a 
caretaker relative to attend high 
school (or General Education Develop-
ment (GED) classes) on a full-time 
basis. (5) child care for a period not to 
exceed two months that enables a 
caretaker relative to participate in 
Employment Search or another AFDC 
work program; and (6) provide that 
the decision as to whether any individ-
ual will be recognized as essential to 
the recipient's well-being shall rest 
both with the recipient, and be sup-
ported and concurred in by the agency 
supervisory staff—a person of a higher 
position or authority than the first 
line caseworker or income mainte-
nance intake employee. A person will 
be considered incapacitated for pur-
poses of the previous sentence when 
he has a physical or mental defect, ill-
ness, or impairment. The incapacity 
shall be supported by medical evidence 
and/or recorded testimony of a li-
censed medical health care profession-
al, and must be of such a debilitating 
nature as to reduce substantially or 
eliminate his/her ability to support or 
care for himself/herself and be ex-
pected to last for a period of at least 
thirty (30) days. A finding of eligibility 
for OASDI or SSI benefits, based on 
disability or blindness, is acceptable 
proof of incapacity. The definition of 
the term full-time, applicable to both 
minor and adult caretaker relatives, as 
used above in paragraph (a)(2)(vii)(a) 
( i) , (3), and (4) of this section shall be 
consistent with the definition used by 
the State for purposes of the earned 
income disregards at § 233.20(a)(ll). 
(viii) Provide that the money 
amount of any need item included in 
the standard will not be prorated or 
otherwise reduced solely because of 
the presence in the household of a 
non-legally responsible individual; and 
the agency will not assume any contri-
bution from such individual for the 
support of the assistance unit except 
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as provided in paragraphs (a)(3)(xiv) 
and (a)(5) of this section and § 233.51 
of this part. 
(ix) For AFDC, provide that a State 
shall consider utility payments made 
in lieu of any direct rental payment to 
a landlord or public housing agency to 
be shelter costs for applicants or re-
cipients living in housing assisted 
under the U.S. Housing Act of 1937. as 
amended, and section 236 of the Na-
tional Housing Act. The amount con-
sidered as a shelter payment shall not 
exceed the total amount the applicant 
or recipient is expected to contribute 
for the cost of housing as determined 
by HUD. Utility payments means only 
those payments made directly to a 
utility company or supplier which are 
for gas. electricity, water, heating fuel, 
sewerage systems, and trash and gar-
bage collection. Utility payments are 
made "in lieu of any direct rental pay-
ment to a landlord or public housing 
agency" when, and only when, the 
AFDC family pays its entire required 
contribution at HUD's direction to one 
or more utility companies and does 
not make any direct payment to the 
landlord or the public housing agency. 
Housing covered by "the U.S. Housing 
Act of 1937. as amended, and section 
236 of the National Housing Act" 
means Department of Housing and 
Urban Development assisted housing 
which includes Indian and public 
housing, section 8 new and existing 
rental housing, and section 236 rental 
housing. 
(3) Income and resources, (i) (A) 
OAA, AB, APTD, AABD, Specify the 
amount and types of real and personal 
property, including liquid assets, that 
may be reserved, i.e., retained to meet 
the current and future needs while as-
sistance is received on a continuing 
basis. In addition to the home, person-
al effects, automobile and income pro-
ducing property allowed by the 
agency, the amount of real and per-
sonal property, including liquid assets, 
that can be reserved for each individ-
ual recipient shall not be in excess of 
two thousand dollars. Policies may 
allow reasonable proportions of 
income from businesses or farms to be 
used to increase capital assets, so that 
income may be increased; and (B) in 
AFDC—The amount of real and per-
§ 233.20 
sonal property that can be reserved 
for each assistance unit shall not be in 
excess of one thousand dollars equity 
value (or such lesser amount as the 
State specifies in its State plan) ex-
cluding only: 
(1) The home which is the usual res-
idence of the assistance unit; 
(2) One automobile, up to $1,500 of 
equity value or such lower limit as the 
State may specify in the State plan; 
(any excess equity value must be ap-
plied towards the general resource 
limit specified in the State plan); 
(3) One burial plot (as defined in the 
State plan) for each member of the as-
sistance unit; 
(4) Bona fide funeral agreements (as 
defined and within limits specified in 
the State plan) up to a total of $1,500 
in equity value or such lower limit as 
the State may specify in the State 
plan for each member of the assist-
ance unit (any excess equity value 
must be applied towards the general 
resource limit specified in the State 
plan). This provision addresses only 
formal agreements for funeral and 
burial expenses such as burial con-
tracts, burial trusts or other funeral 
arrangements (generally with licensed 
funeral directors) and does not apply 
to other assets (e.g., passbook bank ac-
counts, simple set-aside of savings, and 
cash surrender value of life insurance 
policies); 
(5) Real property for a period of six 
consecutive months (or, at the option 
of the State, nine consecutive months) 
which the family is making a good 
faith effort (as defined in the State 
plan) to sell, subject to the following 
provisions. The family must sign an 
agreement to dispose of the property 
and to repay the amount of aid re-
ceived during such period that would 
not have been paid had the property 
been sold at the beginning of such 
period, but not to exceed the amount 
of the net proceeds of the sale. The 
family has five working days from the 
date it realizes cash from the sale of 
the excess real property to repay the 
overpayment; failure to make repay-
ment within this period results in the 
cash being considered to be an avail-
able resource. If the family becomes 
ineligible for AFDC for any other 
reason during the conditional pay-
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ment period while making a good faith 
effort to sell the property, or fails to 
sell the property by the end of the 
period despite such a good faith effort, 
then the amount of the overpayment 
attributable to the real property will 
not be determined and recovery will 
not be begun until the property is, in 
fact, sold. However, if the property 
was intentionally sold at less than fair 
market value so that a good faith 
effort to sell it was not made, or if it is 
otherwise determined that a good 
faith effort to sell the property is not 
being made, the overpayment amount 
shall be computed using the fair 
market value determined at the begin-
ning of the period. For applicants, the 
conditional payment period begins 
with the first payment month for 
which all otherwise applicable eligibil-
ity conditions are met and payment is 
authorized. For recipients who acquire 
property while receiving assistance/ 
the period begins with the payment 
month in which the recipient receives 
the property; and 
(6) At State option, basic mainte-
nance items essential to day-to-day 
living such as clothes, furniture and 
other similarly essential items of limit-
ed value. 
(ii) Provide that in determining need 
and the amount of the assistance pay-
ment, after all policies governing the 
reserves and allowances and disregard 
or setting aside of income and re-
sources referred to in this section have 
been uniformly applied: 
(A) In determining need, all remain-
ing income and resources shall be con-
sidered in relation to the State's need 
standard; 
(B) In determining financial eligibil-
ity and the amount of the assistance 
payment all remaining income (except 
unemployment compensation received 
by an unemployed principal earner) 
and, except for AFDC, all resources 
may be considered in relation to either 
the State's need standard or the 
State's payment standard. Unemploy-
ment compensation received by an un-
employed principal earner shall be 
considered only by subtracting it from 
the amount of the assistance payment 
after the payment has been deter-
mined under the State's payment 
method; 
(C) States may have policies which 
provide for allocating an individual's 
income for his or her own support if 
the individual is not applying for or 
receiving assistance; for the support of 
other individuals living in the same 
household but not receiving assist-
ance; and for the support of other in-
dividuals living in another household. 
Such other individuals are those who 
are or could be claimed by the individ-
ual as dependents for determining 
Federal personal income tax liability, 
or those he or she is legally obligated 
to support. No income may be allocat-
ed to meet the needs of an individual 
who has been sanctioned under 
§§224.51, 232.11(a)(2), 232.12(d), 
238.22 or 240.22 or who is required to 
be included in the assistance unit and 
has failed to cooperate. The amount 
allocated for the individual and the 
other individuals who are living in the 
home must not exceed the State's 
need standard amount for a family 
group of the same composition. The 
amount allocated for individuals not 
living in the home must not exceed 
the amount actually paid. 
(D) Income after application of dis-
regards, except as provided in para-
graph (a)(3)(xiii) of this section, and 
resources available for current use 
shall be considered. To the extent not 
inconsistent with any other provision 
of this chapter, income and resources 
are considered available both when ac-
tually available and when the appli-
cant or recipient has a legal interest in 
a liquidated sum and has the legal 
ability to make such sum available for 
support and maintenance. 
(E) For AFDC, income tax refunds, 
but such payments shall be considered 
as resources; and 
(F) When the AFDC assistance 
unit's income, after applying applica-
ble disregards, exceeds the State need 
standard for the family because of re-
ceipt of nonrecurring earned or un-
earned lump sum income (including 
for AFDC, title II and other retroac-
tive monthly benefits, and payments 
in the nature of a windfall, e.g., inher-
itances or lottery winnings, personal 
injury and worker compensation 
awards, to the extent it is not ear-
marked and used for the purpose for 
which it is paid, i.e., monies for back 
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medical bills resulting from accidents 
or injury, funeral and burial costs, re-
placement or repair of resources, etc.), 
the family will be ineligible for aid for 
the full number of months derived by 
dividing the sum of the lump sum 
income and other income by the 
monthly need standard for a family of 
that size. Any income remaining from 
this calculation is income in the first 
month following the period of ineligi-
bility. The period of ineligibility shall 
begin with the month of receipt of the 
nonrecurring income or, at State 
option, as late as the corresponding 
payment month. For purposes of ap-
plying the lump sum provision, family 
includes all persons whose needs are 
taken into account in determining eli-
gibility and the amount of the assist-
ance payment, and includes solely for 
determining the income and resources 
of a family an individual who must be 
in a family pursuant to 
§206.10(a)(l)(vii) but who does not 
meet a condition of his or her eligibil-
ity due to a failure to cooperate or is 
required by law to have his or her 
needs excluded from an assistance 
unit's AFDC grant calculation due to 
the failure to perform some action. A 
State may shorten the remaining 
period of ineligibility when: the stand-
ard of need increases and the amount 
the family would have received also 
changes (e.g., situations involving ad-
ditions to the family unit during the 
period of ineligibility of persons who 
are otherwise eligible for assistance); 
the lump sum income or a portion 
thereof becomes unavailable to the 
family for a reason beyond the control 
of the family; or the family incurs and 
pays for medical expenses. If the State 
chooses to shorten the period of ineli-
gibility, the State plan shall: 
(1) Identify which of the above situ-
ations are included; 
(2) In the case of situations involv-
ing an increase in the need standard 
and changes in the amount that 
should have been paid to the family, 
specify the types of circumstances 
which will be included; 
(3) In the case of situations involv-
ing the unavailability of the lump sum 
income, include a definition of un-
availability, and specify what reasons 
will be considered beyond the control 
of the family; and 
(4) In the case of situations involv-
ing the payment of medical expenses, 
specify the types of medical expenses 
the State will allow to be offset 
against the lump sum income. 
For purposes of this paragraph 
(a)(3): Automobile means a passenger 
car or other motor vehicle used to pro-
vide transportation of persons or 
goods. (In AFDC, in appropriate geo-
graphic areas, one alternate primary 
mode of transportation may be substi-
tuted for the automobile); Equity 
value means fair market value minus 
encumbrances (legal debts); Fair 
market value means the price an item 
of a particular make, model, size, ma-
terial or condition will sell for on the 
open market in the geographic area in-
volved (If a motor vehicle is especially 
equipped with apparatus for the 
handicapped, the apparatus shall not 
increase the value of the vehicle); 
Liquid assets are those properties in 
the form of cash or other financial in-
struments which are convertible to 
cash and include savings accounts, 
checking accounts, stocks, bonds, 
mutual fund shares, promissory notes, 
mortgages, cash value of insurance 
policies, and similar properties; Need 
standard means the money value as-
signed by the State to the basic and 
special needs it recognizes as essential 
for applicants and recipients; Payment 
standard means the amount from 
which non-exempt income is subtract-
ed; 
(iii) States may prorate income re-
ceived by individuals employed on a 
contractual basis over the period of 
the contract or may prorate intermit-
tent income received quarterly, semi-
annually, or yearly over the period 
covered by the income. In OAA, AB, 
APTD and AABD, they may use the 
prorated amount to determine need 
under § 233.23 and the amount of the 
assistance payment under §§ 233.24 
and 233.25. In AFDC. they may use 
the prorated amount to determine 
need under § 233.33 and the amount of 
the assistance payment under 
§§ 233.34 and 233.35. 
(iv) Provide that in determining the 
availability of income and resources. 
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122Eliqibilitv Workers 
1. Roles: 
Determine eligibility for temporary and appropriate benefits accurately 
and timely; select from a wide variety of programs those necessary to 
support clients in their efforts to become self sufficient. 
2. Responsibilities 
A. Contact each client who applies. 
B. Provide information so each client can make informed decisions. 
C. Determine with the client which programs are applicable to her 
circumstances. 
D. Explore strategies for overcoming barriers and assist the client to 
obtain needed services. 
E. Make appropriate referrals to the self sufficiency worker and allied 
agencies. 
F. Monitor and redetermine eligibility. 
G. Keep records which document eligibility and clients' movement 
toward goals. 
H, Encourage and support appropriately. 
3. Expectations: 
A. Use all skills, information, tools and resources available to assist 
the client. 
(Continued on Next Page) 
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B. Refrain from assuming responsibilities which belong to the client. 
C. Foster clients' ownership of her self sufficiency pathway. 
D. Refrain from making moral or personal judgements. 
E. Observe the rights of the client - refer to Section 110 for rights 
of client. 
F. Safeguard information and protect confidentiality . 
G. Offer problem resolution opportunities. 
4. Rights: 
To keep professional and personal life separate. The professional 
worker is not expected to be the best friend of the clients. Rather 
the worker should be available to the clients in a professional setting. 
In that setting, the relationship with the clients will be a 
professional one. 
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438 Lump Sum Payments and other Income in Excess of Standard Needs Budget 
Lump sum payments, including Social Security Lump sums, VA lump sums, 
unemployment compensation lump sums, and other one time payments, are 
income. Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) payments are NOT lump sum 
payments. Lump sums can be earned or unearned income. 
1. If a household's net countable income (including the net amount of the 
lump sum payment) exceeds the standard needs budget, then the 
amount in excess of the standard needs budget will count as income for 
future months. (Unless the only reason the net income exceeds the 
standard budget is because a recipient is paid weekly or biweekly and 
receives an extra check in a month). 
2. The client will be ineligible for assistance iur me number of months 
determined by dividing the net countable income for the budget month 
by the standard budget for the household size for the payment month. 
Any amount remaining will only count for the month following the last 
month of ineligibility. 
3. A net lump sum* payment that causes the net countable income to 
exceed the standard budget in the budget month will cause the 
household to be ineligible starting with the corresponding payment 
month. 
EXAMPLE: 
Ms. A has net countable income of $50.00 received during the budget 
month of January. In January she also received a lump sum of $1,750. 
Net lump sum: That portion of a lump sum left after excluding: 
1. Legal fees expended in the effort to make the lump sum available AND 
2. Payments for past medical bills. 
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She has a household of two with standard budget of $407. Determine 
her period of ineligibility by adding the $50.00 net countable income to 
the lump sum of $1,750. This equals $1,800. 
Divide $1,800 by the standard budget amount of $407.00. $407 will 
go into $1,800 four full times with a remainder of $172. 
The open AFDC case would be closed the end of February because the 
client is ineligible for four months beginning with March and ending with 
June. If the client reapplies in July, then the remainder of $172 will be 
added to any July income she may have to determine eligibility for July 
and the initial grant for July. 
4. If the lump sum, plus any net countable income, is less than the 
Standard Needs Budget Figure, then continue to compute the grant by 
counting the lump sum received in the budget month as income to be 
subtracted from the grant in the payment month. 
5. A lump sum received either before or after the date of application in the 
month of application, shall be counted as income in the month of 
application. 
If the case is ineligible, and the application is thus denied, then the 
month of application is the first month in the period of ineligibility. 
6. Do not count a lump sum received before the month of application. 
7. A lump sum received after the month of closure shall not be counted nor 
can it be used to extend the period of ineligibility. 
8. Treat as a separate assistance unit new household members who meet 
the 2 rules below: 
(Continued on next page) 
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A. The new member is born or moves into the home after the lump 
sum is received. 
AND 
B. The new member was not included as part of the SNB used to 
figure the period of ineligibility. 
Do not use the lump sum income when determining eligibility and 
grant amount. Use all other household income. Include the 
income of household members who are not eligible due to the 
receipt of the lump sum. 
The lump sum funds are not an asset for the new members. But, 
all other household assets must be considered. 
Use the figures from Table II for the number of new household 
members to determine eligibility and the amount of payment. For 
example, if a child is born after the period of ineligibility is 
calculated, base the grant for that child on a household size of 1. 
Beginning the month following the last month of ineligibility, all 
family members must be in one household. This rule applies even 
if there is an amount remaining from the lump sum that is used as 
income. 
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